Why does God hate the poor? Does he will His hate of the poor?
Almost universally among continental philosophers, they see the human will as the driving force of human nature. Among many it is also the driving force and even the substance and essence of reality. For example, the idealism of Hegel with its dialectical logic of the spirit of history eventually became both the world concept of the fascists and the material class struggle of the communists. For Schopenhaurer, man’s will was the substance and driving force of reality. For Friedrich Nietzsche, it was the will to power that was a driving force of nature and humanity. Even the leap of faith that is the basis for Kierkegaard’s Christian theology was a leap of the will. Existentialism depends on the will to give meaning to the meaninglessness of the universe in which existence comes before essence. However, other than the concept of ethics, there is probably no word that is more distorted and practically meaningless in the working class perspective of life — which is the perspective of these essays and this blog.
The word “will” as it is usually used and for which it is useful and therefore as is its meaning cannot be applied to God. Theological talk treating the will of God and free will as if they were the same type of word is one of the biggest cons by theology on the poor and the working class. To will something requires one lacks it and wants it. God is omnipresent, all powerful, and the source of what there is instead of nothing. He needs nothing. He is complete and whole, always was, is, and will be. Therefore, this meaning of will cannot be applied to God as an omnipresent all-powerful being because She does not need anything.
“Will” however also describes wanting to continue. At least for the moment, I am alive and want to continue living instead of committing suicide. This existential reality is different from wanting something such as meaning for my existence: the will that leads to hope. As Friedrich Nietzsche said, hope is the worst of all evils because it prolongs the torments of man.
However, at least this concept of will involving only existence does not entail lacking something and therefore, at least in theory, can be applied to God. Or can it? If God exists and continues to will his existence, such implies that He could commit suicide by not willing to exist. Ontologically, this seems to be a possibility. God got the poker game of the universe going but do we need Her around any longer to continue its existence? He is the reason there is something instead of nothing, but now that there is something, does the something need Him to continue? The Dealer calls the game but can we now change the dealer?
We are forgetting in this paradox our philosophy of language reality and getting caught up in our own words. These questions ignore the ontology that we are talking about because they assume or imply God acting in time. We exist. We continue to will our existence. One day we may not exist. We exist in time. Time is our relative perception of the possibilities around us and their coming to life around us. God does not exist in time. He is omnipresent by the definition of the concept of God, that is why we have the ontological proof for Her existence. The something that is now includes time because we our conscious of it and perceive it and thus create changing relationships based on our needs, but God has no needs and is the source of time and therefore is outside of time. By the definition of God, if She existed in time then we would have to ask why is there this something god in time instead of nothing. That would lead us again by necessity to the reason there is something instead of nothing: God — outside of time. Time is a meaningless word when applied to God.
Everything is a “now” to the God of the ontological proof — there is no past or future. The concept of will only applies nominally to God in the sense that He is the reason there is something instead of nothing. He wills the something and continues it by definition. But this use of “will” is not will in the sense of a choice. A choice would mean that God has options between one thing or another, that He is incomplete in some way, that He exists in time in some way. Only incomplete beings have options or choices because they are incomplete. That is not ontologically possible for the concept of God. As the ontological proof goes, God is the perfect omnipotent omniscient originator of the universe, the reason why there is something instead of nothing. There is nothing God lacks requiring a will for it. God does not exist in time, so He cannot will existing now and not later or vice versa. Thus, whether He wills the poor and His hatred for them are meaningless questions that only apply nominally to the question we are asking. Nominally, God does will the poor and His hatred of them in the same way that He wills all creation: by necessity.
In summary, we have reached a point of having numerous answers. In our contemplation of the question of why God hates the poor, we know that God knows and thinks about the poor and His hatred for them in an analytical completely ontological sense and wills it in the sense that His will is also his existence and by necessity the existence of something instead of nothing. The poor and His hatred of them are a necessary part of the something for which He is the reason that exists. Also we have been able to conclude that neither justice, morality, ethics, or fairness bars such hatred of the poor. The poor and God’s hate of them exists necessarily but why? Why not love them necessarily?
Before we go further to answer the question of why, there is the question of hatred itself. What does hate mean? Does God hate in the same way we hate? Does God love in the same way we love? Could He love the poor instead of hating them and treating them in the way He does? These will be our final questions on this issue.