Picking Your Battles

History is class struggle, but within this class struggle exist the individual struggles that make up our lives. In these individual struggles, one must pick and choose the right battles to fight or not to fight in order to have any chance to survive getting involved in the class struggle. There is an interesting historical anecdote about General Robert E. Lee regarding his life after the Civil War. At a mass at his local Southern Episcopal Church right after the War, at communion time the first person to get in line to receive communion was an elderly Black man recently freed from slavery as a result of the War; this was the congregation’s first encounter with the supposedly new integrated South and it simply sat in stunned silence with no one knowing what to do. Until, one elderly but distinguished man got up from his pew and got into line behind the Black man; then, others joined the communion line. According to the story, the man second in line was the recently discharged veteran General Lee. At some point, even after the greatest and most hateful of struggles, if one actually believes in life more than death as meaning in life, one has got to let go and get on with life. Unlike the concepts of race and racism, getting involved in language self-identity battles — be they sex, gender, feminist, or whatever — are not battles worth fighting and should be let go quickly if begun. Once one accepts that language including its words and the meaning of its words is a social construct, it is conceptually inconsistent, holistically illogical, and practically hypocritical and wasteful to engage in individual battles of self-identity either with the proverbial Self or any of the so-called Other or Others and to get involved with self-identity politics unless they have a class struggle component. Fighting worthless battles distracts and detracts from the class struggle that really does ultimately identify and define us.

 
I have contemplated elsewhere the reality of self-identity. The existential reason for one’s existence that makes up one’s soul or the spiritual reality of the proverbial Self precedes the social construction of language and is not something of which we can speak in language — except perhaps at best indirectly or implicitly through the illusions and delusions of aesthetics. The battle for one’s soul and its demons will always be a private battle fought in silence. But, the unfortunate or fortunate reality is also that the meaning of the words “one’s self-identity” or anything similar trying to mean the self-identity of the Self is a social construction created by social construction through the Self’s struggles with Others and by struggles among Others. It is fortunate that there is no self-identified purely private self-identity because if there really were a “self-identity” created only by the Self, there will be no way to avoid solipsism and the possibility that we spend our whole lives talking to ourselves — either as a mind of ideas or as a material brain in a vat. The unfortunate reality is that “one’s self-identity” is what society says it is; you are what Others say you are even if your Self disagrees with it. It is only through the social construction of language that we know we are not alone. Take away social behavior and its resulting language in either direct form or indirect form such as by the experience that makes up memory and there is nothing remaining of “self-identity”. The unfortunate and fortunate reality is that if society and its social construction of language call you or name your identity as a wimp, tomboy, feminine male, masculine female, A or B type personality, as Blackness or Whiteness or whatever race, or as whatever, regardless of how distasteful you find it or how much you dislike being called such words, those words are your identity including your self-identity.

 
Can you try to change your self-identity created by social construction? Yes, struggling for such change is an option. At one time, a social construct “feminine male” for example would start lifting weights, getting involved in physical sports, and be socially aggressive in order to change how social construction identifies them. Now, the option exists to do actual physical surgery converting the physical appearance of someone in order to avoid the “feminine male” identity. The same is true for the reverse. It may work, but it may not. It may occur, as is occurring now, that the concept of “feminine male” will be phased out, be considered bigoted, and replaced by concepts such as transgender or one of the many new socially constructed genders; or, the entire social construct process of assigning feminine and masculine attributes may eventually be phased out in favor of unisex attributes. This latter progression is not that unusual in English because English lacks the grammatical genders contained in Romance Languages such as Latin, French, Italian, and so forth. Unlike these languages, many of our English words and their meanings are and have always been unisex. (As always, the French post-modern and other continental intelligentsia and their worshipers here in American intelligentsia who are so quick to criticize and ridicule English and American language use and usefulness should look at their own glass houses first before throwing stones at ours.) In which case, your new social construct self-identity may be transgender or apparently whatever you want it to be seems to be the new language fad. Regardless, no one controls their self-identity, it is controlled by what social construction is willing to accept. It may be willing to accept only two genders, it may be willing to accept six billion genders; either way, your self-identity is what society and especially its ruling class says it is. Sure you can disagree with it and thus add to the struggle that is life, but is it worth the battle? Is it worth the battle for your Self to fight with the Others who are struggling with their self-identity?

 
Whether one needs or wants to fight their social construct self-identity is a personal struggle all individuals should be free to make. Frankly, if “acceptance” of your self-identity requires that you physically or surgically start cutting off or cutting out healthy parts of your healthy body, I would suggest that you would be better off in acceptance of your social construct self-identity and in the forgetting of whatever your Self’s self-identity may be; however, ultimately, it is your body and your decision to make and you will get no struggle from me on making it.

 
However, what about when this self-identity struggle becomes a public struggle? That is, what about when individuals start demanding social support and perhaps social expenditure upon their individual struggle to change their socially constructed self-identity? This is when intelligent choices need to be on what battles to fight and which not to fight. The guide to use is: first, determine how the battle will affect class struggle; then, if there will be no adverse effect or it will be minimal, go onto more important battles and let the individuals struggle and perhaps even change social construct self-identities.

 
Perfect examples of how this process ought to work are the present ongoing feminist demands and resulting disputes on whether transgenders and the like will be allowed to compete athletically with their social construct opposites or to use their bathrooms — such as allowing transgender females to compete in women’s sports and to use women’s bathrooms and the reverse though the reverse seems to be much less common. This is simply a battle not worth fighting. If feminists really want transgender females to compete in women’s sports, let them. The worse that can happen is that the transgender females will win. This is not a class struggle; if women have a problem with feminists advocating and successfully getting want they want in society, let them work it out among themselves. Similarly, there is the issue of bathroom use. Feminists want transgender females to use female bathrooms, fine, let them. If this is a problem, let them work it out among themselves, it is not a class struggle. I have no problem with a transgender male using a male bathroom with me; compared to some of the things I saw in public bathrooms growing up in the Chicago area and while in the Navy, I doubt this would even raise an eyebrow if I saw it (try imagining what a Navy shipboard crew’s head looks like after sanitary tanks were inadvertently blown inboard instead of outboard — not a pretty site or smell). If you are concerned about a daughter who might not feel safe in such a public bathroom with a transgender female, teach her to deal with it as necessary. A truly independent woman should be able to deal with and know how to feel and be safe in a lot worse things and experiences in life then what may be or may not be a dude using her public restroom. When the feminists start feeling unsafe in their bathrooms, they will quickly abandon the transgender source of their discomfort anyway and amend feminist dogma so as to oppose it.

 
The same is usually true of most feminist struggles: better just give them what they want and avoid the battle. Feminists want women to be treated equally as men treat each other? Fine, treat them so. Men treat each other very badly is the reality of the patriarchy; if feminists want the same treatment, fine. Such surrender to the feminist struggle is much better than the present state of affairs in which feminists want and usually get all the benefits of being in control of a patriarchy without any of the adversities. They want forced affirmative action so that 50% of all professions such as doctors, lawyers, and academics are women; fine, use the same force also to make 50% of all soldiers, sailors, and first responders women.

 
One self-identity battle that is worth fighting is the self-identity politics of Whiteness and Blackness. Here we are 150 years after General Lee got in line beyond someone identified at the time as a Black man; it is universally accepted that race defined by skin color is an unnecessary social construct so that no man or any person should any longer be identified as Black or White; and yet concepts such as Blackness and Whiteness are still fueling all sorts of trouble and racism. They do so because race and racism not only are social constructs maintaining a ruling class but are also economic social constructs that make money for the ruling class and its intelligentsia thus not only conceptually but materially are empowering the ruling class. As I have written in other essays, sycophants and intellectual proletariats such as Ta-Nehisi Coates get rich and become ruling class elitists by complaining about race and racism and would be nothing without them; thus, they have no incentive to eliminate them, and they promote new school race and racism as the source of meaning for their lives. “Race is more than a biological category or a social category. It has become an industry, with its own infrastructure, branches, incentives and agendas.” — Sowell, Thomas. Intellectuals and Race. p. 128. Fighting both the old school racism of the past and the new school racism of the present new school racists such as Coates and the like is not an individual struggle of self-identity but class struggle that must be fought.

Water As A Person, Huh?

I recently inadvertently came across an article in the Vermont Journal of Environmental Law arguing for treatment of water as a person under the law in order to give it many if not all of the protections granted persons under the law. I skimmed it and had a good laugh but it then occurred to me how this article is a good exemplification or microcosm of the nature of modern language and of various topics in the philosophy of language such as the absence of any “meaning” for words other than their use and usefulness in any given context.

 
For the moment, water most definitely does not fall into any meaning of “person” except in an aesthetic sense created by poets or rhetoric. However, the same could have been said at one time for entities, concepts, attributes, or things such as corporations, unincorporated companies and associations, trusts, municipalities, states, and even the European Union which is now considered a “person” under much of European law. Hell, even rivers are recognized as persons in some African national legal systems and in tribal legal systems in other countries — even New Zealand does it for one of their rivers in respect of Maori tribal law worshiping a specific river as an ancestor. So, why not add water to the list of human and non-human entities recognized as persons by the law? Why stop at water? Why not treat fire, mountains, the sky, or anything else needing legal protection as a person? The Maori culture historically also worships ritual warfare, slavery, cannibalism, sexual abuse of women, killing of female children, and revenge killings, why does not New Zealand recognize any of these as persons needing respect under the law? Obviously, the cultural process by which words change meaning is convoluted yet it is amazing and impressive how smoothly and quickly such changes can occur when those in power want to change the meaning of words — even when the changes encompass or assume radical changes both in the background and in the foundation metaphysics and physics of reality. An obvious example of such radical changes in both metaphysics and physical conceptualizations of reality is the recent popular and very powerful adoption of radical changes in both metaphysical and physical meanings of the words “gender” and “sex” over a period of only the last few years. Despite this convoluted process, there can be described two universal aspects to this process of meaning change brought out by this simple example of water beginning its path to becoming a person: 1) it results from an teleological act of a will to power not from logical reasoning nor is it derived from sense experience; 2) the resulting change in meaning though it relies upon physical and metaphysical assumptions does not embody either physical or metaphysical foreknowledge — that is regardless of how ethically and thus aesthetically pleasing the change in meaning may be, the change in meaning will not necessarily change reality to meet the teleological motivations for the change so as to be pragmatically or even naturally true.

 
Reasoning does not care what specific premises, axioms, or whatever assumptions are used to begin one’s reasoning. Reasoning is at best a process or methodology for preserving truth however one defines truth not for gaining knowledge of truth. If one starts with true premises, axioms, or assumption, sound reasoning will preserve that truth and valid reasoning will assure it is impossible for the premises to be true and the conclusion false. However, reasoning cannot guarantee one is starting the reasoning process with truth.

 
Nothing in reality or sense experience requires an axiom, premise, or assumption treating water as a person. If one believes water needs to be treated as a person, for whatever reasons one believes this, this set or context of beliefs gives one the teleological or normative goal of having the use and usefulness of the word “water” be the same as the use or usefulness of the word “person” within that context or set of beliefs. The ultimate goal is to give water the same power as a person in our reasoning. If this act of will has the power of violence upon others, especially a monopoly on violence such as the law, this act of will can be compelled upon others to force them to have the same belief in water as a person in order to achieve the teleological or normative goals for the change in meaning. For example, the argument for treating water as a person usually begins with the premises that water is necessary for all persons to live and to enjoy life and that the abundance and purity of water is being threatened by technological pollution of water thus threatening human life. These premises can be derived directly from sense experience. There are then an uncountable number of conceptual options for dealing with these empirical problems. One option is the teleological or normative goal of treating water as a person legally, ethically, or even pragmatically. This is a creative option that is both aesthetically and normative pleasing but is not derived from sense experience but derived existentially and conceptually in the same holistic way we derive “I am therefore I think” and “I think therefore I want more than just thinking” as I have contemplated in other essays. Acceptance of this creative option creates the law and ethics and even the facts to justify itself and not the other way around: the conclusion and supporting facts are created by the act of will wanting water to be a person in the same way any act of will is created. It is not the case that facts lead to the teleological normative goal but the facts are created to justify that goal. An explanation of the creation of this act of will is not something of which we can speak within any language wordgame other than that of intention and will because this existential act of will precedes language as I have contemplated in other essays

 

Even the simple act of will of raising my left arm at this precise moment cannot be explained empirically or conceptually in any way but as an act of will or intentional act. Science can talk all it wants about neurons in the brain being activated that then activate electrical and chemical signals in nerves that extend into my arm but none of these explanations describe why or how “I” activated the neurons to begin this process of raising my left arm nor the nature of this “I” that started this process of raising my hand.

 
Once our act of will successfully leads to a change in meaning, the change will not necessarily change reality so as to achieve the teleological or normative goal for making the change — though it might. Reality is still what it is and we cannot lose sight of this fact. Conceptually, at present “person” has more power than “water”. By making water a person, though this raises the power of water to equality with a person in our conceptualization of reality, because all power is relative this equality means reducing the power of person to the same as that of water in our conceptualization of reality. What effect this will to power for water at the expense of person will have on the pragmatics of our conceptualization of reality is an unknown. Just as when the Supremes in their wisdom made corporations “persons” for many constitutional purposes, this change in meaning strengthened the power of corporations but weakened that of persons in the sense that persons were no longer more powerful than corporations. Perhaps the best example of such distinction is abortion. Making a “fetus” mean the same as “choice” is a result of the teleological normative goal of giving a pregnant woman the power of life or death over a certain form of life. The reality of that form of life and its death have not changed by this change in meaning and the final effect of such a change in meaning upon a society that allows and enforces it by violence is unknown. As the philosopher Thomas Nagel said about evolutionary explanations for morality:

Even if we took the most optimistic view possible, and assumed that in general men’s consciences have been approximately molded by evolutionary forces, the best we could hope for is that they should lay down principles which have been useful. Unlike the God it has replaced, natural selection cannot be supposed to possess or to embody foreknowledge.

If the human race perishes in a nuclear war, it may well be (although there will be no one alive to say it) that scientific beliefs did not, in a sufficiently long time scale, promote “survival”. Yet that will not have been because the scientific theories were not rationally acceptable, but because our use of them was irrational. In fact, if rationality were measured by survival-value, then the proto-beliefs of the cockroach, who has been around for tens of millions of years longer than we, would have a far higher claim to rationality than the sum total of human knowledge.

 

We can see these two aspects present and being ignored in the recent and ongoing arguments for the meaning of “sex” and “gender”. Empirically, the word gender was taken from linguistics and incorporated into problems dealing with differences among the male and female sexes by psychiatrists dealing with individuals who were hermaphrodites, androgynous, or had other unusual sexual characteristics such as bodies that appear female but have XY chromosomes. As with all words, even the word “sex” commonly used to mean a distinct biological male/female distinction has some vagueness and ambiguity as is true of all words because language is a social construct whose meaning is dependent on the context of its use and usefulness. Empirically and scientifically, defining sex involves many factors of physical attributes, chemicals in the body, and even conceptual genetic combinations that are not as clear and distinct as is commonly assumed. We could have more than two biological sexes: 1) male; 2) female; 3) hermaphrodites; 4) intersex (androgynous); 5) gonadal dysgenesis (women with xy chromosomes); 6) infertile persons; and probably some more if we really wanted them.

 
No one wanted more than two and there was no reason to do so until the 1970’s when feminists picked up on this sex/gender distinction to try to break the association of what they considered to be socially constructed male behaviourial characteristics with the male sex and of what they considered to be socially constructed female behaviourial characteristics with the female sex. As with the water/person meaning change, this feminist theory had a teleological normative goal of empowering the female sex by eliminating what they considered to be an unequal power balance in favor of the male sex so as to supposedly equalize power between the sexes. Regardless of whether one disputes the soundness or validity of their arguments, in the last few years these arguments and their teleological normative goals have been accepted by the law, academia, and ethics along with the assumed metaphysics and physics that justifies the change in meaning of gender for now but eventually also for sex. As I wrote in my previous essay Not Utopian But Heavenly, the ultimate goal of this assumed dogmatic metaphysics and physics appears to be not a utopia but a heaven on earth socially constructed consisting of angelic humans equal sexually because there will be no sex. Thanks to this teleological process taking over the monopoly on violence called the law, such a genderless and sexless society in which everyone is their own gender creating their own sex seems to be our future for the foreseeable future absence some catastrophe or revolution.

 
What effect will these changes in meaning for sex and gender have upon reality? Despite everyone involved pretending to know, just as no one knows what the result of making water a person will be, no one really knows what the result will be of  changing the meanings of sex and gender will be. Despite our inability unambiguously to define “sex” empirically as is true for all definitions because all words are vague social constructs, in all known sense experience there are two and only two sexes for purposes of reproduction which is a fairly important aspect of reality. These two — male and female sexes — are necessary for persons to reproduce and thus for societies to continue living. Heaven may be sexless but heaven does not need physically to reproduce. Even for test tube babies we need a male and a female contribution to the tube. Of course, life was not always divided into male and female. For hundreds of millions of years and perhaps billions of years, life consisting of single cell and even multiple cell individual lives reproduced and prospered without two sexes or any sex, there was only individuals. This seems to be the future desired by those who presently control our social will to power to change meaning in the wordgame language of sex and gender: a world of individuals defining their own sex and gender. The Powers have the will to power to achieve this just as they soon will be doing with the wordgame language of water and person, but will this change in language succeed in changing reality? If reality does not go along with our language telling it what to do, what then? Maybe the proto-beliefs of the cockroach will give them the last laugh on all of us.

Charity Not Love

The word love is everywhere these days. From the actual and seriously taken presidential campaign of Marianne Williamson to all popular secular and religious philosophies. (Personally, I loved Williamson’s campaign — for great comic relief if for nothing else. She seem to be the only real person in the whole bunch.) Love is seen as the answer to all problems involving human relations in almost any form. So, why is not “love” listed in any of the classical virtues going back to Plato’s Republic nor in the list of Western theological virtues? These two sets of virtues total seven and consist of prudence, justice, temperance, courage (or fortitude), faith, hope, and charity. It is with good reason love is excluded and I am getting tried of hearing about love as if it is a cure-all. When everyone seems to agree on a concept, one should immediately be suspicious of it as either a delusion or a con.

 
As I contemplated in my essay asking Why Does God Hate the Poor: Can God Love? Part III , love is a self-centered act and one side of a two sided coin in which hate is the other side. One cannot know love if one does not know hate and the reverse. Love is the relationship we have to that which gives meaning to our life; hate is the relationship we have to that which denies meaning to our life. Love is the answer? To what? What is the question? So, love of money, power, sex, rape, child molestation, your tribe, or the almost uncountable number of acts most people would call evil and which the evil love are answers to evil? If you love your neighbor must you not hate if not the evil person who hurts them but the evil acts that hurt them? Must you not hate evil acts? According to those who preach love is the answer, you must hate and punish racism, sexism, fascism, and much more in order to be a truly loving person. Love is not the answer but only an answer to certain specific problems. Even assuming it is somehow possible to love your enemies, loving their evil acts only helps your enemies do evil to you and to others and to spread their evil acts — however you define evil. By definition, to love truly, you must hate the evil acts of those you love to help them see the Good.

 
As is often true, the Ancients and the Medieval Scholastics were wiser than much of modern philosophy in their contemplations and so they intelligently left “love” out of their list of virtues to instead include Charity. Charity is considered a theological virtue because supposedly it cannot occur naturally, it is a gift from God in which a person sees God and other persons not as a means to an end — such as achieving meaning in one’s life — but simply as an end-in-itself. It is not a two-sided coin as is love and hate. Its absence is not uncharity or the state of being uncharitable but is simply its negation or absence — just as nothingness does not replace being as an state of existence but is simply nothing regardless of what Husserl, Heidegger, Sartre, or their worshipers otherwise preach in their aesthetics.

 
Is Charity a meaningful concept existentially or in any pragmatic form or is it itself simply aesthetics? Is it used and useful only in the same way as the words “Pegasus”, “the Self”, “the Other”, or any of the other uncountable amount of words available for preachers of certain ethics and moralities to use to promote their self-centered images of how the world ought to be? Does it have pragmatic value for nihilism? Maybe. At a minimum, it gives us a word to use and is useful for pointing out the absurdity and the shallowness of the omnipresence of “love” in present society as another false god. Nihilists can do better than love.

Quantitatively Based Classes

In my book They Hate if You’re Clever and Despise a Fool, I argue social classes are an inevitable and necessary part of any society because class struggle is necessary for social progress. I end the book with proposed classes to be accepted consisting of 1) Patricians subdivided into true Patricians and Capitalists and their supporting intelligentsia; 2) Plebeians subdivided into petite bourgeoisie, wage slave proletariat, and intellectual proletariat; and 3) Lumpenproletaria. These classes are conceptually qualitative. Upon further reflection, I now understand this ending proposal to have been wrong. Recognizing qualitatively defined classes in practice only serves to tip the balance in favor of those with the power to define concepts and quality which are always the ruling classes and their Inner and Outer Party. Classes should be defined as best as possible numerically so it is evident to each person in what class they are and in what class they want to be. In addition, numerically defined classes will allow for explicit conceptualization of what obligations are owed to each class by the government and what obligations are owed to the government by each class. All language is vague including numeric language, but the vagueness can be dealt with much better through the use of quantitative rather than qualitatively defined social classes. Probably the best way to do this is by using property-based classes as was used by the Roman Republic.

 
I have dealt with this issue before when contemplating the use of standardized testing as a measure of education and for school admissions. The argument against standardized testing is that standardized testing favors the rich and the dominant culture because they have the resources to prepare for these tests and their culture defines the correct answers to these tests; further, qualitative methodology such as interviews and examination of life experience is argued supposedly to allow for creating and accepting diversity in a student body. This argument is nonsense in practice. In reality, all methodology favors the rich and the dominant culture regardless of whether it is standardized testing or supposed qualitative methodology. However, the advantage of standardized testing, especially for STEM subjects, is that the answers are the same for all classes and thus all are measured by the same standard. 2+2=4 for both the rich and the poor. If a poor person gets correct answers on a standardized test, they must be accepted as correct in the same way an upper class correct answer must be accepted on such test. This is not true of qualitative testing. What a hiring or admission committee wants to hear and the form in which they want to hear the answer to whatever nonsense questions they ask for diversity purposes is best known and usually known only by someone who has grown up in the upper class culture of the committee members since birth. Unlike math, such socialization is not something one can learn outside one’s social class; it is something one is born into and one grows up in and into. For these non-standardized examinations, 2+2 may in fact =5 when they want it to equal 5. One knows when 2+2=5 by growing up in the social class that decides when 2+2=5 not by learning it.

 
As is fairly well-known, the Roman Republic was divided up into three general classes consisting of Patricians, Plebeians, and Slaves. However, through their censuses, the Republic further divided these classes quantitatively. These subdivisions though varying at times generally consisted of: Senatores owing property value of > 1,000,000 sestertii; Equites > 400,000 sestertii; Plebeian commoners of the First Order >100,000; Second Order >75,000; Third Order >50,000; Fourth Order >25,000; Fifth Order >11,000; less than 11,000 and the landless poor were considered Proles and Proletarii. These classes were used to define the representatives each class got in the various assemblies of the Republic; the votes each of their representatives held in each assembly; and the number of electors each class received when it came time to vote for the patrician senators including the Tribune of the Plebs in the Senate and for any legislation passed by the Senate. These classes also decided the required contribution of each citizen to the Roman military. For example, the Equites were called such because they were required to provide horses and cavalry; the First Order Plebeians became the famous Triarii of the Roman Army of the Republic — the Latin expression equivalent to our “when the going gets tough, the tough get going” was “time to bring in the Triarii.” Even the Prols and Proletarii, as freemen, were expected to provide oarsmen for the war galleys. These economic-based classes and the class consciousness, struggle, and resilience they created transformed the failed and sacked Roman Kingdom from a tribe limited to the City of Rome and the surrounding hills to the Roman Republic conqueror of the Italian Peninsula in a hundred years and then of most of Europe and of the Mediterranean within the remaining 400 years of its life. As always occurs, the Patrician class eventually got too powerful, overcame the power of the other classes, and the Republic became the Empire — our future unless we wake up to it.

 
When creating such classes, we must make sure to count gross ownership of property and economic value not net ownership — that is, we must not subtract for debt. Being in debt runs the risk of eventual failure but at least it indicates one has hope in the future and hope in society — it links one’s success to the success of society and the reverse because society needs you to succeed and get its investment back at least and hopefully profit — again, there is hope there. Julius Caesar at the time of his rising to power was the wealthiest person in Rome but also the most indebted. He did this intentionally according to historians because both gave him power. His wealth gave him power directly. His debt gave him indirectly the full power of the wealth of his creditors because they all needed for him to succeed so as to profit. For the individual, having “f–k you” wealth is great but not for society. Debt is one of the ways a society builds the future and assures everyone is invested in that future and the reverse.

 
Not sure why I made this mistake in the book. I wrote the book more as a descriptive conceptual analysis of race and class than a normative suggestion of what they could be or should be which I do not like doing anyway. In the end, I prefer anarchy. In any anarchy, the natural class divisions based on wealth will develop on their own. The big problem is to get the power of the law away from trying to negate these natural class divisions — when the law gets involved, the end result is always the same: the Republic becomes the Empire and then its Fall.

Abraham And Isaac

The Old Testament Abraham and Isaac story is a favorite among both Judeo and Christian believers accepting it as a story describing and venerating the virtue of Faith as a theological virtue with a capital “F”. It is a simple but an effective authoritative story: God commands Abraham to sacrifice his son Isaac in worship to God; Abraham takes Isaac to a sacrificial altar ready for the killing; but, just as the fatal blow is about to be struck, a messenger from God stops Abraham saying “now I know you fear God”; in his son’s place, Abraham sacrifices a ram instead of Isaac — lucky ram. Abraham and his children go on to be the founding family of the Jewish religion and nation directly and eventually Christianity indirectly. Even the Christian existentialist Kierkegaard considered Abraham a “Knight of Faith”. It is a very aesthetically pleasing story but morality has the moral backwards. Blindly following authority, especially the authority of a god or even the voice of God that by definition can kill you if you disobey is not Faith but rational self-interest. The true test of Faith and even of faith in the integrity of a godless authority is the ability and option to reject its commands and yet trust that in the end the authority will still be fair and mercifully good.

 
I do not want to deconstruct the story of Abraham and Isaac. As sophisticated as deconstruction sounds, the result is always predictable: deconstructive interpretation is used to argue all authority uses storytelling to justify and demand blind allegiance to those who control the story telling warranting social justice struggle to overcome this authority with the new authority and the new storytelling called ethics of those doing the deconstruction — however this new storytelling is somehow exempt from this same critique. No, rather the nihilist option is to take the story at face value as the words of this story would be used and are useful in present culture — or really in any post-Enlightenment culture: a dude hears the voice of God telling him to kill his son and does it. Or, almost does it but is stopped by the voice of an angel. Would anyone see this dude as a Knight of Faith venerating God? Doubt it. Regardless of whether or not the dude actually heard these voices, except among religious fanatics, we would see him as a murderer or attempted murderer warranting either criminal punishment or civil commitment to a psychiatric institution. Gradually, our enlightened society has created a more benevolent version of God who does not need sacrificial rams to stroke Their ego — or at least no more than One. So, why is the Abraham/Isaac story still a significant storytelling tradition in present culture?

It is so not only for Christian existentialist writers such as Kierkegaard but even for the post-modern atheist likes of a Jacques Derrida and Emmanuel Levinas who wrote considerable contemplations on its meaning — though as usual, I cannot make any sense of what they wrote but also as usual it always ends up with the usual pontificating on the need to see the Self in the Other and a conclusion requiring ethics to overcome ontology; that is, they repeat the simple poetic aesthetics of the Beatitudes in multiple pages of convoluted verbiage apparently advocating having Christian virtues without the Christ all of which avoid at all cost mentioning the Beatitudes. Of course, Kierkegaard was not a connoisseur of clarity either. Both Derrida and Levinas and the like ignore the fact that the ontology of ethics is simply the morality of the powerful which they must ignore in order to achieve the desired poetic aesthetics — something which Kierkegaard at least has the consistency not to do. In their storytelling, Abraham is replaced by the Self, Issac by the Other, and God becomes the Good as they define it in any particular situation. In short they love the grossly out-of-date story of Abraham and Isaac because Abraham does what is expected of him by authority: say yes to its demands. Regardless of how much verbiage they write to hide it, unlike Kierkegaard who honestly admitted his goal, ultimately their goal is to preach and achieve the same blind allegiance to their voices as Abraham gave to his voices.

 
Let us take the story of Abraham and Isaac at face value as a nihilist would and not as it can be deconstructed and not through some hero/knight or other leadership or ethical worshiping story because as nihilists we need no leaders nor do we need ethics. From the perspective of nihilism as a morality, what does this story mean in the present and in any foreseeable future for post-modern humanity? Nihilism as a morality opposes and struggles against any delusions of meaning for life. It means that if you hear God demanding you kill your son or daughter or even a fricken ram purely as a sign of faith in God as life’s meaning, tell God to go screw Themselves. Do not do it. Do not try to rationalize doing it or not doing it. Rationality can provide a reason to do anything or not do anything depending on whether you want to do it or not do it and on whether you are looking hard enough for a rationalization. Except for gods, everyone really wants God to exist. If you hear the voice of God, you really want it to be the voice of God. If the voice of God tells you to kill your child, you will want to kill your child and rationally the thing to do is to kill your child. After all, it is the voice of God! It would be irrational perhaps insane to rebel against the voice of an infinite omnipotent Power. So, you must be irrational and say no. By obeying God’s command you would be justifying this arbitrary and random demand as a Leap to Faith (as Kierkegaard argued) and give it meaning. Life has no meaning. Nothing you do will change that. As Dostoevsky asked, does the salvation of millions give meaning to the suffering of an innocent child? No. Say no to a voice that wants to create such meaning: this no is the Leap to Faith of a true nihilist and their God.

Faith as a virtue with a capital “F” for a nihilist is based not on the ethics of authority nor on any ethics but on Acceptance of authority as it is: an arbitrary and random power with no meaning other than power as an end-in-itself. As a nihilist, you have a moral obligation to oppose any delusion of meaning in life because such opposition is what gives your life the only meaning it has and thus morally you must oppose the voice of authority even if it is authority with a capital “A”.

 
Is it imaginable for God arbitrarily and randomly to ask a believer to kill their own child for no reason other than a show of power? Sure, why not? God is God, can do whatever He, She, It wants to do — if you do not kill the child, God might do it on Their own. Whatever. There are infinite possibilities as to what may be in the mind of God or of the gods and Fates. However, is it also imaginable for you to say “no”? Sure, it is. A Leap to Faith is to say no, not yes. Killing for a reason is not Faith, it is reason. Not killing for a reason is also not Faith, it is reason. There is virtue in being reasonable and there is virtue in being faithful to an authority we believe has pragmatically sound intentions or good intentions, however this is not Faith. If there is a God, Their intentions are Their existential acts. With God, logic by necessity goes from the universal to the existential without being an Existential Fallacy. Virtue based beliefs of good intentions by God ignore the reality that God’s intentions are by necessity also acts; such beliefs are a denial of the nature of God not a Leap to Faith in the nature of God. If there is a God, there will be knowledge and acceptance of your nature as you are and were destined to be and not judgment of your life based on how the likes of Kierkegaard, Derrida, Levinas, or anyone else say you ought to be. You must give God the same respect as you expect from God — thus, just as you expect God to say “no” to any arbitrary and random demands for the death of an innocent, you must expect of yourself to say “no” to the death of an innocent when arbitrarily and randomly demanded by God. What happens next, is a matter of Faith.

 
How does this story apply to the faith demanded by the earthly gods of authority — varying from the power of law to the power of ethics superseding ontology as demanded by Derrida, Levinas, and the Other worshipers of Rule Following either liberal or conservative, Marxist or libertarian, and so forth? It does not. The Abraham/Isaac story deals with theological Faith in God not with faith toward earthly gods regardless of how much contemplation is wasted on pretending it has something to do with either ontology or ethics. F–k them. Faith in an earthly god is purely a small “f” and pragmatic. If these gods demand you kill your child thus by definition making this killing ethical and you believe there is good reason warranting such killing, do it as your moral choice and suffer the consequences; if not, do not do it as your moral choice and suffer the consequences. There is no moral obligation to comply with the authority of ethics or with any authority. Acceptance of authority with a small “a” is a matter of pragmatics. Obviously, if the authority has the power to imprison or kill you unless you comply with their authority, the moral balance is in their favor; but this does not mean you have to like it and give such balance moral acceptance — wait for the opportunity to struggle and defeat their authority. If you have the moral power to say “no” to any ethics or morality and by doing so create your own morality — what happens next is in the hands of the Fates and is a matter of Faith.

On Suicide: A Nihilist’s Memoir

Excerpt from my book with the above title:

What do I believe in when I believe that man has a soul? What do I believe in when I believe this substance contains two carbon rings? In both cases, there is a picture in the foreground, but the sense lies far in the background, that is, the application of the picture is not easy to survey. — Wittgenstein, Ludwig. Philosophical Investigations. Trans. G.E.M. Anscombe, P.M.S. Hacker, Joachim Schulter. Blackwell Publishing: West Sussex, England (2009) at ¶422.

Technological Society is making enormous progress in the goal of eliminating physical violence and its pain from the world. Soon, the use and usefulness of physical violence as a means of social struggle will be limited to the ethics with a monopoly on violence called law. Part of this progress will include the acceptance of suicide or euthanasia as it is sometimes called as a pain killer option for physical violence inflicted upon the individual by the universe such as aging and physical sickness. I have never had a problem with this acceptance nor is it an aspect of Despair. The natural course of events will eventually allow for suicide in euthanasia form to become an acceptable social practice, this acceptance has no effect upon acceptance of suicide as an act of the soul rejecting life. However, with this acceptance, the distinction between suicide of the body and suicide of the soul will become important. If suicide is socially accepted and allowed as a permanent pain killer for physical pain that makes life not worth living why not allow it for Despair in life as not worth living?

 
I do not want to get into metaphysical arguments as to whether there is a mind/body distinction; as Camus said in the beginning epigram of this book, these are games that keep me busy in life after I have decided life is worth living but do answer the question of whether it is worth living. Philosophers and the Other so disposed may ridicule the soul as a category error, but for one who is truly contemplating suicide not just pretending to do so, questioning the meaning of life and finding no answer is a distinct reality from asking whether one should take antidepressants for breakfast to get through the day. Whether or not the brain may or may not need the latter does not answer the former question. These are distinct wordgames. The holistic whole of the Self and Other suffer Despair not the brain or any other part of the whole individual; The brain may need drugs to make it through the day but I want an answer to my question on the meaning of life to make it through life without contemplation of suicide and suicide.

 
Ignoring such a conceptional distinction is a symptom one is not actually contemplating suicide but only engaging in aesthetics in order to avoid its contemplation; it is a sign of delusion and incompleteness in one’s philosophy making it hypocritical at best as popular reasoning and fundamentally unsound as intellectual reasoning. Physicists when resolving their physics problems now ignore the nonsensical nature of i and the infinity (∞) within π and e, however ignoring them does not change the fact that the concept of √-1 is conceptually different from √1 nor does it solve Zeno’s Paradoxes or Thomson’s Lamp Paradox that occur when treating ∞ as a sense experience or even as a number. Such ignoring of conceptual problems is allowed physicists so they may achieve the predictive meanings of their wordgames. Philosophy is not seeking predictive meaning for life to resolve Despair but meaning in an existential sense. Analogously, scientists, so-called cognitive scientists, and other pragmatists trying to eliminate sense experience symptoms of Despair may ignore the homunculus fallacy when trying to eliminate empirical symptoms of Despair, but such ignoring does not solve my Despair nor anyone’s Despair; even if eliminative materialists are correct in arguing that the pronoun “I” simply represents a collection of chemicals in the brain, this does not change the fact that I feel Despair at such a description of reality regardless of how powerful the “I” of those who fabricate such descriptions feel from their materialist wordgame and the tenure and popularity it gives them among those who share their Blue Pill.

 

Philosophers who ignore a conceptual difference between the body and the soul in the “one truly serious philosophical problem” expressed by Despair are either in Despair themselves and have taken a Blue Pill to ignore it or God has given them the gift of being a god for whom existence is an end-in-itself — in which case, they most likely have no soul thus the question at issue does not matter. I am therefore I think and I want more than just thinking from life is the reality leading me to Despair; if one is satisfied solely with the aesthetics of thinking as an end-in-itself, then luckily one is saved from Despair. I know Despair even in moments cold-bloodedly free of any pain. In fact, it is in these moments free of pain in which Despair is most likely to lead one to suicide in the sense of it being a rejection of life: not just as a shock reaction to physical pain in which my act of suicide may be an affirmation of life. Suicide of the soul involves a denial of life done with a clear mind seeing life for the random and arbitrary farce it is and rejecting it.

 
I therefore submit the following definition for the “soul”: it is that aspect of the holistic individual that seeks meaning in life beyond mere existence. It is the attribute of the holistic individual that makes my present contemplation possible.

Not Utopian But Heavenly

For when they rise from the dead, they will neither marry nor be given in marriage, but are as angels in heaven. … He is not the God of the dead but of the living.
— Mark 12:25, 27

One of the funnier aspects — or sad depending on your perspective — of the secular religions now running Western Civilization is their assumption — or hijacking depending on your perspective — of Christian dogma upon which to build the foundation for their social engineering. All presently popular Western social justice theory is Christianity without the Christ and usually without even the God aspect; one’s conclusions as to whether conceptually or pragmatically this makes sense is the perspective from which you would find this fact either funny, sad, assumption, or hijacking. One problem however is indisputable, it allows for the criticism that all present popular Western social justice theory is “utopian”, meaning it aims to achieve an idealistic, cosmically just perfect state that is really unattainable. This criticism is not entirely accurate, however, more importantly, it is not fair to Thomas Moore and his book Utopia. Neither Thomas Moore nor Utopia were idealistic moralists living in an academic or other ivory tower of power. Moore lived in a very practical world in which he was eventually martyred for his beliefs when he opposed Henry VIII’s creation of his own secular religion in opposition to Moore’s beloved Catholic Church. Utopia was actually a satirical but pragmatic critique of many Romantic notions of the 15th and 16th Century seeking to create societies we would now call utopian in which Moore proposed practical alternatives. For example, Utopia still had slavery but it was limited to criminals who had committed serious crimes who would forfeit the right to freedom protected by society. A better description of modern social justice theory would be “heavenly”; not only does it depend on Christian dogma for its foundation, it seeks to create a heaven on earth. A good example of this heavenly conceptualization at work is the present omnipresent disputes regarding “gender”.

 
The present argument for allowing all individuals to define their own gender is premised on “gender” being a social construct. Unfortunately, as much as opponents try to argue against this premise, the reality of language is that it is a social construct; what the disputes leave out however is the fact that all language and all words are social constructs. The meaning of all words is their use and usefulness. Saying gender is a social construct is in itself and should be seen as a fairly worthless statement; one can say the same thing for almost every word or sentence including numbers and mathematics. “2+2=4″ may be a social construct; this does not change the fact that if you are going to decide one day to mean “3″ by your first use of any “2″ in a sentence and thus make sense of “2+2=5″, you should probably check with others and get their approval before doing so or you will have a hard time surviving in even the most primitive of society.

 
Though it follows from modern philosophy of language that “gender” is a social construct, no one making the currently popular argument that gender is a social construct relies or, I doubt, has even read any philosophy of language to make this argument. Philosophy of language is very dense and difficult to read for the simple reason it is using language to contemplate language. What has actually happened is that feminists, secular humanists, and many others whose normative goal is elimination of what they see as a male dominated society have jumped on the concept of “social construct” as a means to that end: if we eliminate male and female and make all individuals equal genders there will be no supposed domination of the female gender by the male gender thus giving all individuals the freedom to be all they can be — except for the freedom of choosing a society with just two genders male and female which will be denied as a given. As always, the purveyors of an ethics and morality want to create a world in their image and use the necessary attribute of violence in all ethics and morality to achieve that creation. The end justifies the reasoning and not the other way around.

 
Conceptually, one must admit, it makes sense. Given the foreseeable power of Technological Society, if the creators of this image can harness that power, they might be able to get away with it: test tube babies, hormone drug therapies, surgery, psychiatric drugs, educational propaganda techniques, and so forth. A world of androgynous individuals living without any battles between the sexes and perhaps even without sex and thus without all of the trouble and misery such activity has caused past societies may be our future of peace? What would such a society look like?

 
Well, we actually have an image of what it would look like: heaven. Though angels — and even demons — can take either masculine or feminine form while doing whatever it is they are doing on earth, in the Christian biblical concept of angels (ignoring the Book of Mormon), they are sexless and genderless. If it is good enough for heaven, why not for this earth? A society made up of genderless happy angels not engaging in competitive battles between the sexes working for the common good in which each gives to society going to their ability and gets according to their need, sounds good in words. We should check the reality of heaven to see how it works out though.

 
According to biblical scholars and theologians, though genderless, heaven is not classless. It turns out the angels are divided into three spheres: the First Sphere made up of the famous and well-known Seraphim, Cherubim, and Thrones; the Second Sphere made up of Dominions, Virtues, and Powers; and the Third Sphere containing the famous Archangels and just regular Angels. What do all these angels do? Worship God’s Will of course as God deems necessary with each having responsibility for various aspects of Creation; the higher the responsibility, the higher the Sphere. The job of the highest class of angels, the Seraphim, until ordered to do some task directly by God, is to circle God’s Throne continuously shouting: “Holy, holy, holy is the Lord of hosts; the whole earth is full of His glory!” — Isaiah 6:1-7. (Sounds kinda like a CEO surrounded by an ass-kissing board of directors.) As I have always argued, there is no such thing as a classless society. Unfortunately, there is not much one can do to rebel against classes created by God — though I hear some angels gave it a shot anyway; good for them.

 
So, in addition to foundational dogma, the goals of post-modern social justice theory has assumed — or hijacked depending on your perspective — the Christian concept of heaven. Utopia was still on this earth though its ideas not of it in the classical Christian sense. Any verbiage that seeks a heaven on earth is not on this earth nor of it. We should respect the martyr Moore and stop using “utopian” to describe something that is really not satirical nor pragmatical but normative with a goal of creating a heaven on earth — something Moore wrote against in Utopia.

 
The goals of modern popular social justice theory especially in its post-modern form which lacks the sense of humor required for satire are not utopian but heavenly; they seek to make us all angels doing … ah … what? It cannot be to worship God’s Will, that is a big heresy in the dogma of this secular heaven. So, what is it? Is it perhaps to worship the wills of the gods of this secular heaven? As Orwell calls them, the will of the High of his 1984? I will leave the reader to contemplate this question with the guidance of Orwell.